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ABSTRACT
We propose that plaintiffs in securities fraud actions should use state
inspection statutes to obtain discovery about potential securities fraud
cases. First, we argue that the Private Securities Law Reform Act has
substantially increased shareholders' difficulty in uncovering securities
fraud. Next, we show that shareholders have an alternative method of
investigating fraud: state inspection statutes. We then analyze cases filed
under the Delaware inspection statute to examine the costs to plaintiffs of
pursuing claims under this statute. We find that the statutory inspection
process is a largely successful, although expensive and time-consuming,
process. Nevertheless, potential plaintiffs could realize substantial bene-
fits from utilizing inspection statutes in this manner, particularly if Dela-
ware streamlined its inspection process to make it faster and less costly
for shareholders seeking information.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW'
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("Reform Act" or "PSLRA")2 in an effort to curtail the perceived mis-
uses by professional plaintiffs of the private securities litigation process.3
The Reform Act was designed to cut back on the number of securities
fraud lawsuits filed by private investors by: raising the pleading require-
ments for these suits; placing stringent restrictions on class action filings
by certain shareholders; increasing potential sanctions against plaintiffs
and their lawyers for filing frivolous securities suits; and imposing a stay
of all discovery if the defendant company files a motion to dismiss the
action.4
Just as Congress intended, these new rules will discourage plaintiffs
from filing poorly pled, weak fraud cases or will hasten their early dismis-
sal at a lower cost to the defendants. Unfortunately, by making it much
more difficult for plaintiffs to litigate securities fraud class actions,
PSLRA will also have the effect of eliminating some meritorious lawsuits
I This article is the companion to Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331
(1996), by Randall S. Thomas. That article focuses on the use of state inspection
statutes in derivative actions. The two articles overlap in certain areas, primarily
where they discuss state law issues and the empirical results presented in this article.
2 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) ("The private securities litigation
system is too important to the integrity of the American capital markets to allow this
system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits.").
I See infra Parts I.A.-D. for further discussion of these provisions of the Reform
Act.
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that would otherwise deter securities fraud or punish wrongdoers.
How should a plaintiff with a legitimate securities fraud case proceed in
the face of the Reform Act? Under the new law, the plaintiff will need to
plead fraud with particularity without obtaining any nonpublic informa-
tion from the defendants.' Undoubtedly, some plaintiffs will be able to
satisfy the heightened requirement that they state facts sufficient to estab-
lish a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter-that is,
with intent to defraud-without resort to the discovery process.7 In most
cases, however, only in the unusual circumstance where the defendants
have disclosed these facts in their own federal securities filings, or in the
course of an ongoing federal investigation, would information sufficient
to satisfy the pleading requirements become publicly available.' Plaintiffs
with potentially legitimate securities fraud grievances who lack sufficient
hard evidence of fraud will need to look elsewhere to inquire further into
potential claims.
We suggest that shareholders who are potential plaintiffs in securities
fraud actions use state inspection statutes to obtain more information to
substantiate potential securities fraud claims before filing a class action
lawsuit.9 Shareholders seeking to investigate potential fraud have a statu-
tory right to access the company's internal files under state corporate
law.'0 If the shareholders can establish a "credible possibility" of fraud
5 See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335, 354 (1995)
(noting that the Reform Act raises "concerns that some good cases may be thrown
out with the bad"); Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996) (arguing that civil securities
fraud lawsuits play a critical role in deterring fraud and improving capital market
efficiency).
6 The Congressional Conference Report to PSLRA makes it clear that Congress
wanted to "strengthen existing pleading requirements" beyond those previously re-
quired under the most stringent standards. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41. "For
this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard cer-
tain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." Id. at 48 n.23.
7 For an argument that the new pleading requirements may have little effect on
plaintiffs' ability to plead adequately a securities fraud case, see Elliott J. Weiss, The
New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIz.
L. REV. 675, 683 (1996) (claiming that the Reform Act's pleading requirement reason-
ably could be read as creating a standard so high "that plaintiffs would find it virtually
impossible to satisfy," but concluding that the courts will not adopt this interpreta-
tion).
8 Investors in nonreporting companies do not receive mandatory disclosures. In
many cases, however, these investors are more actively involved in the management
of their investment and have access to better information about potential wrongdoing.
9 We recognize that in some cases, such as where the federal statute of limitations
is about to expire, plaintiffs may need to file simultaneously both actions.
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991). For further discussion, see infra
Part II.B.
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and state a proper purpose, state inspection statutes permit a court to
give them access to those corporate books and records that relate to the
alleged fraud."' After reviewing the relevant documents, the sharehold-
ers will be able to determine if they should pursue a federal or state rem-
edy, or, if they do not believe that fraud has occurred, drop any further
litigation plans.
Shareholders also may wish to contact other investors about potential
fraud at the company to learn if they wish to join in a legal action. State
inspection statutes entitle any shareholder to learn the identities of all
other shareholders by obtaining a "stocklist" from the corporation. 2
In cases where the corporation believes that the shareholders' request
has been made in good faith and the company has nothing to hide, man-
agement may choose to provide the requested documents without a fight.
In some circumstances, however, corporate management will refuse the
shareholders' demand for books and records or the stocklist. If so, the
shareholders can seek legal redress by filing suit in state court to force
production of the information. 3 If the shareholders comply with the stat-
11 The "books and records" of the corporation include: appropriate corporate ac-
counting records; minutes of all meetings of the corporation's shareholders, board of
directors or its committees, or of actions taken by written consent by the shareholders
or board of directors; the stocklist materials; and copies of the corporation's certifi-
cate of incorporation, bylaws, written communications to shareholders, and resolu-
tions creating one or more classes of stock. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 16.01
(1994) (describing the records that should be keep by a corporation); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (1991) (including stocklist, books of account, and minute
books as records). In some books and records cases where the plaintiffs have alleged
corporate misconduct, the courts have given them much broader access. See infra
notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
12 A stocklist consists of a list of record shareholders with their names and ad-
dresses, as well as subsidiary information such as magnetic tape compilations, break-
downs of stockholding by depository nominees-commonly referred to as CEDE
breakdowns-and, where appropriate, lists of non-objecting beneficial owners of
stock held by registered brokers and dealers that are available to the issuer under
Rule 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (1996), (the "NOBO list"), and its counterpart for
banks that hold stock for consenting beneficial owners under Rule 14b-2, § 240.14b-2,
(the "COBO list"). For further discussion, see EDWARD ARANOW ET AL., PROXY
CONTEsTs FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 3 (forthcoming 1997).
13 The corporate laws of every state provide shareholders with the statutory right
to inspect a corporation's stocklist and books and records. The Delaware statute ex-
pressly provides that "[a]ny stockholder [of record] ... shall, upon written demand
under oath ... have the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any
proper purpose the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other
books and records." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991).
If the corporation fails to produce the requested documents, the shareholder has
the right to file suit in state court to compel their production. Delaware law allows a
stockholder to sue to compel inspection if its written demand is refused or not an-
swered within five business days. See § 220(c). The proceeding is a summary pro-
[Vol. 77:69
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utory formalities and state a proper purpose for obtaining the docu-
ments, 14 a court generally will order the company to produce information
that is "necessary and essential" to achieve the shareholders' purpose. 15
In this article, we examine the feasibility of shareholders using state
inspection statutes as pre-filing discovery vehicles in potential securities
fraud actions. After exploring the legal requirements for pursuing such
action, we look at the likely costs and benefits to plaintiffs forced to liti-
gate these issues. We use data from cases filed under the Delaware in-
spection statute' 6 in the Delaware Chancery Court during the period
1981-1994.
Our analysis reveals that plaintiffs obtained a stocklist in nearly 80% of
the cases included in our sample,' 7 while they obtained books and records
in about two-thirds of the cases included in the sample.'" The median
time for a successful litigant to obtain the stocklist through the court was
slightly over one month (three months for books and records), while the
unsuccessful litigant in a stocklist case waited a median period of over
two months (nine months for books and records).' 9 Both types of litiga-
tion appear to be costly.
20
Based on these data and our analysis of the legal issues, we conclude
that state inspection statutes are a viable and potentially useful discovery
mechanism for prospective plaintiffs in securities fraud actions. Although
stockholders using such statutes must bear additional expense to deter-
mine if they have a case worth pursuing, the corresponding benefits ap-
ceeding with an accelerated schedule for discovery and trial. The court has plenary
jurisdiction to grant all necessary relief. See generally 2 ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL.,
FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 220 (1993) (providing
commentary and analysis).
14 The general rule is that a stockholder is entitled to inspection only for a proper
purpose; that is, for a lawful and reasonable purpose germane to his status as a stock-
holder. See FOLK, supra note 13, at § 220.7. This requirement allows the court to
balance the requesting stockholder's interest in obtaining information against the cor-
poration's interest in protecting itself and other shareholders from harmful or disrup-
tive inspections. See id.
The burden of proof in establishing a proper purpose lies with the shareholder
when the shareholder is seeking to obtain books and records. See infra notes 87-88
and accompanying text. Where the shareholder wants to get a stocklist, however, the
corporation has the burden of showing that the shareholder's stated purpose is im-
proper. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1035 (Del.
1996) (affirming the Court of Chancery's decision to limit plaintiff's inspection to
"those documents which are essential and sufficient" to the plaintiff's purpose).
16 DEL. CODE ANN. title 8, § 220 (1991).
17 See infra Part III.B.
18 See infra Part III.C.
19 See infra Parts III.B.-C.
20 See id.
1997]
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pear to outweigh the costs. They will experience an improved success
rate in the cases they file, an increased likelihood of early settlement, and
lower costs as a result of pursuing fewer weak cases that courts eventually
will dismiss. However, if Delaware wants to improve the ability of share-
holders of its corporations to obtain the necessary information to detect
securities fraud, it should revise its inspection statute to make it less cost-
ly and faster for plaintiffs to use for discovery purposes.
In Part I we discuss those provisions of the Reform Act that adversely
affect private securities fraud plaintiffs by making it more difficult to pur-
sue securities fraud litigation. In Part II we discuss the availability of
state inspection statutes, particularly that of Delaware, as a mechanism
for pre-litigation discovery. In Part III we discuss the costs, both in time
and money, of using the Delaware inspection statute to obtain informa-
tion. In Part IV we discuss some of the reasons why potential securities
litigation plaintiffs have not rushed to use inspection statutes for pre-suit
discovery. We conclude by noting that Delaware can make its inspection
statute a more effective discovery device by amending it to provide, for
example, for quicker trials and attorney fee awards against unjustifiably
recalcitrant defendants.
I. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM AcT PROVISIONS THAT
ADVERSELY AFFECT PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGANTS
The Reform Act contains four provisions that will discourage many in-
vestors from pursuing securities fraud class actions. First, the Act raised
the pleading standard for securities fraud suits brought under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 2 ' Second, the Act requires
discovery to be stayed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss a se-
curities fraud complaint.22 Third, the Act places restrictions on the ac-
tions of "professional plaintiffs" and class counsel.' Finally, the Act
makes it easier for defendants to seek and obtain sanctions against plain-
tiffs and their counsel for violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.24 The cumulative effect of these new restrictions is to
raise significantly the bar for pursuing a successful securities fraud ac-
tion.25
21 See infra Part I.A.
22 See infra Part I.B.
23 See infra Part I.C.
24 See infra Part I.D.
25 The Reform Act contains several other important provisions that are not the
focus of this article, including: safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements;
limitations on recoverable damages; changes to defendants' proportionate liability
and settlement rights; exclusion from the RICO statute of securities fraud as a predi-
cate act; and revised auditor reporting obligations. For an in-depth discussion of these
aspects of PSLRA, see Avery, supra note 5, at 354-78. We recognize that these other
[Vol. 77:69
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A. Heightened Pleading Requirements for Securities Fraud Complaints
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") requires
plaintiffs claiming securities fraud (or any other type of fraud) to state
their allegations with particularity.2" In enacting the Reform Act, Con-
gress made clear its belief that the FRCP's pleading requirement was un-
successful in deterring private litigants from abusing the federal securities
laws.27 Congress determined that a "uniform and more stringent plead-
ing requirement[] [was needed] to curtail the filing of meritless law-
suits."'
To achieve its objective, Congress decided that a federal securities
fraud complaint must: (1) specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading and the reasons why the statement was misleading, and (2), if
an allegation is made on information and belief, state with particularity
all facts upon which that belief was formed. 9 Furthermore, the com-
plaint must state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter, or intent to defraud,
with respect to each alleged wrongful act or omission.30 This latter re-
quirement codifies a pleading standard for state of mind that is based on
the Second Circuit's case law, a standard which is generally regarded as
the most stringent pleading requirement among the federal circuits.3 '
Congress did not expressly define the requisite state of mind that needs
to be pled for securities fraud liability. The initial bill introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1995 would have precluded liability based
changes will also reduce the incentives that class counsel has to pursue potential
claims under the federal securities laws.
26 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud or mistake be stated
with particularity, while malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind may
be averred generally.).
27 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (noting that Rule 9(b) has not
succeeded in preventing abuse of the securities laws). President Clinton attempted to
stop the passage of the Reform Act with his veto power, stating that the pleading
requirement would "impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims
being heard in Federal courts." Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-
Veto Message from the President of the United States, H. Doc. No. 104-150, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 19, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. H15214-06, available in
1995 WL 752858. The President's concern was that the pleading barrier would be so
high that aggrieved shareholders with serious losses would be unable to pursue their
claims. See id.
28 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id. (adopting explicitly the Second Circuit's "most stringent" pleading stan-
dard, but refusing to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting it); see also
Avery, supra note 5, at 357 (noting that the Reform Act codified a standard for plead-
ing state of mind that is based on the Second Circuit's test, "generally regarded as the
most stringent used today").
1997]
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on reckless conduct in actions for damages under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.32 This bill was subsequently amended to allow liability
based on reckless conduct, following the standard that had been adopted
by most of the federal appellate courts.3 In the Reform Act as adopted,
Congress avoided endorsing any standard of liability for securities fraud
cases and intentionally omitted any implication that recklessness is suffi-
cient to establish civil liability.34
The Reform Act requires courts to dismiss complaints that do not meet
the new pleading standards. 5 Plaintiffs attempting to flesh out their
pleadings can file discovery requests seeking additional information from
defendants. However, unless the court finds discovery necessary to pre-
serve evidence or prevent undue prejudice, all discovery is stayed if the
defendant files a motion to dismiss the case.3 6 If the complaint is dis-
missed, the new legislation requires the court to make specific findings
about the factual and legal basis for the complaint to determine if the
defendant is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.3 7
B. Stay of Discovery
In most federal litigation, the plaintiff requests documents and deposi-
32 See Avery, supra note 5, at 369.
3 See id. at 370 (describing the Seventh Circuit's standard for a reckless omission
as an "'extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care"' (quoting Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977))). As SEC Chair-
man Arthur Levitt pointed out while testifying before Congress in 1995, the reckless-
ness standard assures the markets of a continuous stream of accurate information and
provides corporations with incentives "'to conduct a full inquiry into areas of poten-
tial exposure."' Id. at 370 n.236 (quoting Securities Litigation Reform Proposals-
S.240, S.667 and H.R.1058: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 247 (1995) (testimony
of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)). An actual knowledge standard, by contrast,
would "'virtually foreclose recovery against lawyers, accountants, and financial advis-
ers,"' thereby reducing such professional advisers' efforts to encourage full and com-
plete disclosure. Id.
34 See id. at 370-71 & n.237; cf. Weiss, supra note 7, at 680 & n.33 ("I assume that
to satisfy the requirements of [the Reform Act] in an action under Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must state with particularity ... facts that give rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with some degree of intent to deceive or defraud."). Ultimately
this question will need to be addressed by the Supreme Court, which has previously
reserved decision on the matter. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 378 n.4 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
35 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101,
109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
36 See id.
37 See id. at 742, 748.
[Vol. 77:69
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tions after filing its complaint and meeting with the other party."8 If the
defendant chooses to file a motion to dismiss, it may simultaneously file a
motion to stay discovery pending the court's determination of the disposi-
tive motion. 9 The court has discretion in deciding whether to grant this
motion.4 o
The Reform Act removes the court's discretion, requiring it to stay dis-
covery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss a securities fraud com-
plaint brought under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") or the
Exchange Act.41 Those defendants who obtain a dismissal will benefit
from greatly reduced litigation costs. For plaintiffs, however, the change
means that in most cases they must seek evidence of fraud without the
assistance of the court.
C. Measures to Restrict Class Actions
In theory, class action lawsuits improve judicial handling of actions
brought by large numbers of plaintiffs, each with small claims. 42 The class
action mechanism allows for the aggregation of multiple claims into a
single action with potential efficiencies in the discovery and trial process-
es.43 In the securities field, however, Congress concluded that a class of
"professional plaintiffs" was manipulating the system and that reforms
were needed.44
The Reform Act contains a number of provisions designed to alleviate
this perceived problem. First, each named plaintiff in an action must cer-
tify, inter alia, that she did not purchase the security at the request of her
attorney in order to participate in the lawsuit.45 Second, each plaintiff
must publish a notice of the pendency of the action in a national business
publication or wire service.46 Third, any class member can apply to be
38 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (d), (f) (allowing for discovery requests after the par-
ties have met to plan the time and form of discovery).
39 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
40 See id.
41 See § 101(a)-(b), 109 Stat. at 738, 747. The sole exception to this rule is where
the court finds that the discovery is needed to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice to a party. See id. (stating that all parties are required to preserve all docu-
ments that are relevant to the allegations of the complaint during the pendency of the
motion to dismiss and the stay of discovery). If the motion to dismiss is denied, and
the parties have failed to preserve all documents, there may be disputes over what
documents were relevant and therefore required to be preserved.
42 See Avery, supra note 5, at 371 (noting that critics of the private litigation sys-
tem have expressed concern that the current system is open to abuse).
43 See id. (emphasizing the "powerful deterrent effect" of the class action).
44 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (stating that the House and Sen-
ate committee hearings demonstrated the need to reform the legislation to curtail the
efforts of "professional plaintiffs").
45 See § 101(a)-(b), 109 Stat. at 738, 743.
4 See id.
1997]
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appointed lead plaintiff, and there is a rebuttable presumption that the
class member with the largest financial interest is the most adequate lead
plaintiff.47 Fourth, the Reform Act prohibits any bounty payments or
other bonuses to named plaintiffs.48 Fifth, the Reform Act discourages
courts from allowing a person to be a lead plaintiff in more than five
securities fraud cases during any three-year period. 49 Finally, the Act au-
thorizes the courts to require plaintiffs to post bonds for payment of the
fees and expenses of the defendant.5"
These provisions undoubtedly will discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from
rushing to file poorly drafted complaints with little investigation and
without client consultation. To the extent that they reduce the incentives
for small stockholders and entrepreneurial counsel to ferret out securities
fraud, however, they will also cut back on the policing of the capital mar-
kets.
D. Sanctions for Rule 11 Violations
Sanctions, properly applied, can deter frivolous litigation." Prior to
the Reform Act, courts had two principal sources of discretionary power
to sanction litigants of meritless lawsuits. First, section 11(e) of the Se-
curities Act authorizes a court to assess costs and reasonable attorneys'
17 See id. at 738-39, 743-44. This provision is designed to improve the oversight of
class counsel by the named plaintiffs by making the shareholder with the greatest
financial interest in the litigation the lead plaintiff and by eliminating the "race to the
courthouse." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 34 (stating that this requirement
will encourage "the most capable" representation). Another member of the purport-
ed plaintiff class can rebut this lead plaintiff presumption only by showing that this
individual will not adequately protect the interests of the class or is subject to unique
defenses that render him an incompetent representative. See § 101, 109 Stat. at 739,
744-45.
A few courts have already entered orders permitting institutional investors with
substantial holdings to become lead plaintiff or co-lead plaintiff in securities fraud
actions. See, e.g., Dean Starkman, Fund Displaces Law Firm to Lead Cellstar Law-
suit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1996, at B9; Dean Starkman, Calpers Wins a Lead Role in
Suit Over Grace's Severance Packages, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1996, at B12 (detailing a
state court's order that an institutional investor be given a place as co-lead counsel in
settlement talks in a derivative action).
48 See § 101, 109 Stat. at 740, 745 (requiring that any settlement be dispersed equal-
ly to all class members, including the lead plaintiff, on a per share basis).
49 See id. (stating that a person may be lead plaintiff in no more than five securities
class actions during any three-year period, except as a court may otherwise permit).
50 See id. at 746. The Reform Act contains numerous other provisions that will
reduce the incentives for filing these actions. The most prominent of these changes
caps a court's award of attorney fees and expenses to class counsel at a "reasonable
percentage" of the amount actually paid to the class. Id. at 740, 745.
51 See Avery, supra note 5, at 358-60 (discussing the efficiency of sanctions to deter
frivolous lawsuits without deterring meritorious suits).
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fees against the plaintiff if it determines that a suit is meritless.52 Second,
Rule 111 of the FRCP permits a court to sanction an attorney for filing a
document containing legal contentions that are unwarranted by existing
law and that lack a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of an existing law, or the establishment of new law.54
The courts occasionally have applied these sanctions in securities fraud
cases.
55
The Reform Act requires courts to make specific findings concerning
each party's and attorney's compliance with the Rule 11 requirements.56
If the court finds that there has been a violation of Rule 11, it is required
to impose sanctions.57 If the violation occurs in a responsive pleading or
dispositive motion, the presumptive sanction is the reasonable attorneys'
fees and expenses incurred by the opposing party as a direct result of the
violation.5" If the complaint "substantially fails" to comply with Rule 11,
the presumptive sanction is the total amount of the opposing party's at-
torneys' fees and expenses for the entire action. 59
E. The Effects of the Reform Act on Securities Fraud Complaints
As Congress intended, the Reform Act raises serious procedural and
substantive obstacles for a potential plaintiff in a securities fraud action.6"
As outlined above, a plaintiff will need to have strong, well documented
evidence of fraud before it files a securities fraud action.6' Investors can
52 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994). The Exchange Act
does not contain an equivalent provision.
53 FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (requiring that at least one attorney sign all documents,
listing the occasions under which attorneys can face sanctions, and explaining the na-
ture of those sanctions).
54 See id.
11 See Avery, supra note 5, at 359 & n.170 (citing examples).
56 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101,
109 Stat. 737, 742, 747-48 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (provid-
ing for mandatory sanctions).
57 See id. at 742, 748.
58 See id. This sanction can be avoided in two instances: (1) if the party or attorney
shows that this award would impose an unreasonable burden and would be unjust,
and that the failure to impose the award would not impose a greater burden on the
opposing party; or (2) if the violation was de minimis. See id. In those instances, the
court has discretion to impose whatever sanctions it deems appropriate pursuant to
Rule 11 of the FRCP. See id.
19 See id.; see also Avery, supra note 5, at 360 (discussing this provision of the
Reform Act). This heightened presumptive sanction is, however, afforded the same
possibility for rebuttal as other violations. See supra note 58 for a description of the
rebuttal evidence necessary to defeat the presumption.
60 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (stating that this "legislation
implements needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation").
61 Plaintiffs' counsel appear to be relying more on evidence of potential insider
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no longer file a "bare bones" fraud complaint and then rely on the discov-
ery process to obtain substantiating evidence. Shareholders now will
think twice about filing a securities fraud complaint on the mere suspicion
of fraud. If they decide to file a complaint, they risk dismissal for failure
to meet the heightened pleading standards and may face Rule 11 sanc-
tions for bringing what appears to the court to be a frivolous lawsuit.
The Reform Act's high pleading standards and tight discovery limita-
tions will ensure that only strong securities fraud claims will survive a
motion to dismiss and move into the discovery process. These standards,
however, also exact a cost: courts will dismiss potentially valid actions
where the publicly available evidence of fraud is insufficiently strong. In-
vestors need a mechanism to investigate potential securities fraud com-
plaints in cases where there is some evidence that fraud has occurred, but
not enough to meet the strict pleading requirements of the Reform Act.
Congress has determined that the direct and indirect costs to securities
fraud defendants of using the standard discovery process in civil litigation
outweigh the benefits to the plaintiffs and the public.62 There may be
alternative discovery mechanisms for plaintiffs, however, that would pro-
vide them access to internal corporate documents to investigate fraud
claims. In the next two Parts, we examine the availability, utility, and
costs of state corporate law inspection statutes as an alternative discovery
method in securities fraud cases.
II. STATE INSPECTION STATUTES AS A DISCOVERY DEVICE
IN FRAUD CASES
Securities fraud is only one variety of corporate fraud. Shareholders
are concerned about any fraud that could adversely affect the value of
their investment. If they believe that corporate fraud is occurring, and
corporate management is uncooperative about responding to their con-
cerns, shareholders can seek redress under state or federal law. State law
fraud claims can be either derivative or direct, depending on the nature of
the alleged injury.6"
trading to meet the Reform Act's standards. See Vanessa O'Connell, Lawyers Scan
Insider Sales to Build Suits, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1996, at C1 ("Lawyers who specialize
in suing companies whose stock prices drop increasingly are using insider sales to help
build class-action securities-fraud suits.").
62 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (calling discovery in securities class
actions "fishing expeditions," and noting that some testimony estimated that discov-
ery costs accounted for 80% of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases).
11 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996) (granting motion to dis-
miss in a derivative action and stating that the distinction between an individual and a
derivative claim depends on the nature of the harm and potential relief). The Grimes
court noted that the distinction between a direct claim and a derivative claim has been
articulated frequently by the courts, although it is difficult to apply in practice. See id.
To state an individual claim, the plaintiff must state a claim which is separate and
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In a derivative action, the shareholder sues on behalf of the corpora-
tion for harm done to the corporation. 4 The claim belongs to the corpo-
ration, and the corporation-through its board of directors-must make
a decision whether to assert the claim.6" The plaintiff, therefore, is re-
quired either to make a pre-suit demand on the board to take action to
remedy the alleged wrongdoing or to state with particularity why it need
not demand board action (i.e., plead "demand futility").66 If the plaintiff
makes a demand on the board, then the plaintiff concedes that demand is
required and can only regain control of the litigation by establishing that
the board wrongfully refused the demand.67
To establish demand futility, or that their demand was wrongfully re-
fused, plaintiffs in a derivative action must allege particularized facts that
distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or which implicates a contractual
right of the plaintiff that exists independently from any right of the corporation. See
id.
64 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 15.1, at 639 (1986) (describ-
ing a shareholder's derivative suit as an "accountability mechanism[ I for large formal
organizations"). The suit can be conceptualized as two actions combined into one: (1)
a suit in equity against the corporation seeking an order compelling it to bring (2) a
suit for relief against a third party, often an officer or director, who caused legal injury
to the corporation. See id.
65 See id. at 640-41 (stating that the decision to sue is ordinarily a matter for the
business judgment of directors).
66 See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 (stating this "basic principle" of corporate govern-
ance). Plaintiffs generally prefer to claim that demand is futile so as to retain control
over the litigation. If they make demand on the board of directors to take action, the
board will control the future proceedings in the case. See id. at 1220 (stating that a
plaintiff can no longer claim that demand is excused after making a demand on the
board). Frequently the board will decide not to pursue the litigation, refuse the share-
holders' demand, and move to dismiss the complaint in a demand-required case. See,
e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208 (Del. 1991) (involving board moving to dis-
miss derivative claim after refusing demand by shareholder).
67 See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216, 1218-19 (noting that the plaintiff retains the right
to claim wrongful refusal of the demand). To establish a wrongful refusal of demand
by the board, the shareholder must allege with particularity facts creating a reason-
able doubt that the board acted independently or with due care in responding to the
shareholder's demand. See id. at 1219. If the shareholder establishes a wrongful re-
fusal of demand, the shareholder has the same right to bring the action that would
exist if a court had excused demand as futile. See id.
The Grimes court stated that for purposes of investigating the board's actions in
refusing demand, the plaintiff cannot use the normal discovery processes under the
rules of civil procedure. See id. at 1218 n.22. However, in the same opinion, the court
stressed that the plaintiff still has the right to use the "tools at hand," such as the
inspection statute, to obtain "the relevant corporate records, such as reports or min-
utes, reflecting the corporate action and related information in order to determine
whether or not there is a basis to assert that demand was wrongfully refused." Id. at
1218.
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create a reasonable doubt that either: (1) a majority of the board is in-
dependent for purposes of responding to the demand or refusing the de-
mand6" or (2) the challenged action is protected by the business judgment
rule.69 These pleading requirements aim to deter baseless lawsuits by
screening out weak cases where the plaintiffs' claims are based largely on
the mere suspicion of wrongdoing.
While deterrence of baseless lawsuits is a laudable goal, the courts are
(or should be) concerned that this screen will block legitimate lawsuits
that would remedy actual wrongdoing. Plaintiffs with an otherwise strong
case may need a method of getting nonpublic corporate information in
order to meet the pleading requirements for demand futility. They can-
not use the normal discovery procedures to fully investigate corporate
mismanagement or fraud unless the court finds that they have made alle-
gations of wrongdoing sufficient to establish demand futility or wrongful
refusal.70 However, they frequently cannot allege particularized facts suf-
ficient to satisfy the court and obtain discovery in a derivative action
without first examining internal corporate documents.7 Thus, the plain-
tiffs in a derivative suit frequently lose if the defendant files a motion to
dismiss.
Shareholders seeking evidence of potential securities fraud could turn
to state inspection statutes to aid discovery. For this approach to succeed,
the shareholders would need to have some basis for their fraud claim and
68 Alternatively, the plaintiff could allege that even if the board is independent, a
majority of the board is incapable of acting independently for some other reason, such
as being dominated and controlled by an interested party. See id. at 1216.
69 See id. at 1217 (stating that the requirement will help to create a balanced envi-
ronment which protects valid suits but prevents baseless claims). Under the business
judgment rule, courts presume that corporate directors are informed and act in good
faith to serve the best interests of the company. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984) (placing the burden on the challenging party to rebut this pre-
sumption). In wrongful refusal cases, the court must determine whether there is a
reasonable doubt that the board acted with due care in refusing the shareholder's
demand. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1219.
70 As a general matter, plaintiff shareholders under existing Delaware law have no
right to discovery for the purpose of substantiating the allegations of their complaint.
See, e.g., Levine, 591 A.2d at 208-10. Instead, they must rely on publicly available
information, such as media reports or company SEC filings. See Rales v. Blasband,
634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993) (reminding plaintiffs that, even though they do not
have the right to discovery, they may use the media and government agencies to gath-
er information). This limitation has made it difficult for plaintiffs to survive a motion
to dismiss. See, e.g., Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1210 (dismissing claim because plaintiff
failed to state with particularity why the board's refusal to act was wrong); Levine, 591
A.2d at 214-15 (dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to plead particularized
facts).
71 See supra note 69.
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allege a proper purpose for inspection of corporate information. 72 Be-
low, we explore the use of inspection statutes, particularly that of Dela-
ware, to meet the particularized pleading requirements of derivative suits.
A. Derivative Lawsuits and the "Tools at Hand"
The idea that the Delaware inspection statute 73 ("section 220") should
be used as a discovery device in shareholder derivative actions was first
proposed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Rales v. Blasband.7 " The
Rales court stated that "[s]urprisingly, little use has been made of section
220 as an information-gathering tool in the derivative context. ' 75 The
court proposed that shareholders seek to use section 220 as a pre-filing
discovery device in cases alleging director misconduct. 76 In a subsequent
decision reaffirming Rales, the Delaware Supreme Court alluded to this
use of section 220, reminding plaintiffs to use the "'tools at hand' to ob-
tain the necessary information before filing a derivative action."
77
Section 220 gives derivative suit plaintiffs a means of pre-filing discov-
ery that potentially could reduce the incidence of poorly pled derivative
suits. Using section 220 in this manner would lessen the problems faced
by these plaintiffs in responding to motions to dismiss. An additional ad-
vantage is that cases filed under the inspection statute are expedited.78
B. Using State Inspection Statutes in Potential Securities Fraud Cases
Shareholders face heightened pleading requirements under the Reform
Act that are analogous to those in derivative actions. If they do not al-
lege particularized facts to support a claim of fraud, the court will dismiss
72 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Del. 1993) (stating
that a proper purpose is one reasonably related to the stockholder's interest in the
corporation and not adverse to the company),
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991) (giving stockholders the right to inspect, for
any proper purpose, the corporation's stock ledger, list of stockholders, and other
books and records). For discussion of the Delaware inspection statute, see supra note
13.
74 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993) (encouraging disgruntled plaintiffs to seek
out new sources of information to meet the pleading requirement).
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (footnote omitted). The
Grimes court extensively quoted from the Rales decision on this point. See id. at n.l1.
78 See Estate of Polin v. Diamond State Poultry Co., No. 6374, 1981 WL 7612, at *2
(Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 1981) (deciding that a shareholder's right to inspect books and
records under section 220 of the Delaware Corporate Code is virtually absolute once
a proper purpose is shown). A shareholder who demands inspection is not precluded
from enforcing her right simply because she has another suit pending against the cor-
poration and could obtain the same books and records through discovery. See id.
(rejecting the argument that plaintiffs right to inspect should be barred once she files
a complaint and initiates discovery).
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their complaint.79 Furthermore, in the typical case, shareholders will be
unable to use the normal discovery techniques to resist a motion to dis-
miss."0 Instead, they must use other methods to obtain information or
rely exclusively on public information to investigate securities fraud.
If, after analyzing all publicly available information, shareholders have
strong reasons to believe that fraud or similar wrongdoing has occurred,
but insufficient information to proceed with a securities fraud complaint
or take other appropriate action, they could bring an action under the
state inspection statute to obtain additional necessary information."' As
described below, the rules differ slightly depending on whether share-
holders are requesting books and records or a stocklist.
Shareholders seeking to uncover suspected wrongdoing by corporate
management have a statutory right under Delaware's corporate inspec-
tion statute to examine the company's "books and records."8 2 At a mini-
mum, the "books and records" of a corporation include: corporate ac-
counting records; minutes of all meetings of the shareholders, board of
directors, and board committees; records of actions taken by written con-
sent of the shareholders or board of directors; stocklist materials; the cor-
poration's certificate of incorporation; corporate bylaws; written commu-
nications to shareholders; and copies of resolutions creating one or more
classes of stock.8 3 "Books and records" may also include documents re-
lating to allegedly wrongful transactions.
8 4
79 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§ 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (pro-
viding for dismissal if pleading requirements are not met). For further discussion of
the heightened pleading requirements of the Reform Act, see supra Part I.A.
80 See § 101(a)-(b), 109 Stat. at 741, 747 (providing for stay of discovery while any
motion to dismiss is pending). For further discussion of the stay of discovery under
the Reform Act, see supra Part I.B.
81 See Everett v. Hollywood Park, Inc., No. 14556, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, at *10
(Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1996) (observing that plaintiff engaged expert to analyze publicly
available information, then filed action to compel production of books and records
concerning alleged mismanagement and self-dealing transactions by corporate man-
agement).
82 See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 16.02(a) (1994) ("A shareholder of a corporation
is entitled to inspect and copy ... any of the records of the corporation ....");
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Del. 1996) ("It is
well established that investigation of waste and mismanagement is a proper purpose
for a Section 220 books and records inspection.").
83 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 333 n.11 (citing MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 16.01
(1991)); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (1991) (listing stock ledger, books of
account, and minute books as records maintained by a corporation in the regular
course of business).
84 See Everett, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, at *19-20 (permitting inspection of all docu-
ments examined by a special litigation committee that reviewed same claims in litiga-
tion in another state); Holdgreiwe v. Nostalgia Network, Inc., No. 12914, 1993 Del.
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Any shareholder of record of a Delaware corporation, upon written
demand and statement of a proper purpose, has the right to inspect the
corporation's stocklist and other books and records.85 If the corporation
refuses to permit inspection or fails to respond to the shareholder's re-
quest, the shareholder may seek a court order compelling allowance of
inspection. 6 To obtain such an order, the shareholder must establish that
he made a proper demand for the information and must state a proper
purpose for seeking the information."7 The shareholder seeking books
and records bears the burden of establishing that the stated purpose is
proper.8
A stated purpose could include inspecting the company's books and
records to determine if fraud or corporate mismanagement is occurring,
even if an action is pending against the company.89 This purpose would
be proper even if the inspection would lead to an increased damage
award in the pending lawsuit, because a company has no legitimate inter-
est in avoiding payment of any compensatory damages owed to its own-
ers.9" However, the shareholder's purpose cannot be adverse to the cor-
poration's legitimate interests.91
Ch. LEXIS 71, at *20-21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1993) (ordering inspection of "detailed
financial data, stock transfer books, tax information, intra-corporate communications,
correspondence regarding potential investment in Nostalgia by third parties, press re-
leases, and communications and filings with securities regulators").
85 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991) (outlining the procedure for making
a written request to a company for access to its stocklist and other books and
records).
86 See § 220(c) (establishing the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction to order inspec-
tion).
87 See id. (requiring that the plaintiff establish compliance with procedural require-
ments and a proper purpose); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 685
A.2d 702, 708 (Del. Ch. 1995) (noting that a shareholder must "make a demand under
oath that states a purpose reasonably related to its interest as a shareholder"), affd,
681 A.2d 1026 (Del. 1996).
88 See § 220(c) (setting out requirements); see also Thomas & Betts, 685 A.2d at
709 ("Where the subject of the demanded inspection are [sic] the corporation's books
and records (as distinguished from its stockholder list), the shareholder has the bur-
den of establishing a proper purpose.").
89 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1993) (finding that
inclusion of more plaintiffs in pending litigation would not substantially increase the
company's costs of defending the litigation).
90 See id. In Compaq Computer, the plaintiff requested a stocklist in order to "so-
licit the participation of other shareholders in legitimate non-derivative litigation
against the defendant corporation." Id. at 2. The plaintiffs sought individual damages
for alleged acts of fraud and mismanagement. See id. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to
recover individual damages for securities fraud violations should be able to rely on
Compaq Computer to rebut any claim that investigating such fraud is an improper
purpose.
91 See Thomas & Betts, 685 A.2d at 709. Absent exceptional circumstances, it is
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Where the shareholder seeks to investigate suspected waste or misman-
agement, it must "adduce evidence from which a credible possibility" of
such misdeeds may be inferred.92 However, "[w]hile stockholders have
the burden of coming forward with specific and credible allegations suffi-
cient to warrant a suspicion of waste and mismanagement, they are not
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that waste and
mismanagement are actually occurring."9 If the shareholder satisfies
these requirements, the court will grant access to those books and records
that are "essential and sufficient for the stockholder's purposes.
94
The Delaware courts have held that the scope of inspection should be
broad where a shareholder is investigating possible corporate misman-
agement. 95 In Everett v. Hollywood Park, Inc.,96 the plaintiff offered spe-
cific evidence showing a "pattern of waste and mismanagement" in sever-
al apparently self-dealing transactions involving the company's Chairman
of the Board.97 After deciding that the plaintiff had established her right
to examine the corporation's books and records, the court struggled to
determine the proper scope of discovery.98 The court ultimately allowed
the plaintiff access to all books and records that the company had previ-
not enough for the corporation to claim an interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of its financial information. See id. (noting that the risk will not normally bar the
statutory inspection right). A confidentiality agreement may be enough to address a
corporation's privacy concerns, absent compelling circumstances. See id. at 710.
92 See Everett v. Hollywood Park, Inc., No. 14556, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, at *13
(Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1996) (noting that a plaintiff investigating possible mismanagement
or waste has a higher evidentiary burden to obtain books and records); Thomas &
Betts, 685 A.2d at 710 (concluding that hearsay evidence was insufficiently reliable to
state a proper purpose for obtaining books and records to investigate possible waste
and mismanagement).
93 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Del. 1996).
94 Everett, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, at *19; Thomas & Betts, 685 A.2d at 714 (stating
that courts must construe narrowly a shareholder's right to inspect books and records
so as to provide only those records that are essential and sufficient).
95 See Skoglund v. Ormand Indus., Inc., 372 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. Ch. 1976) (con-
cluding that the right of inspection should not be limited to those transactions that
aroused plaintiffs' suspicions, but should extend to the general records generated dur-
ing the period into which plaintiffs sought to inquire); Holdgreiwe v. Nostalgia Net-
work, Inc., No. 12914, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 71, at *20 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1993) ("If
Mr. Holdgreiwe's inspection of Nostalgia's records is to effectuate its purpose of en-
abling him to determine whether management wrongdoing has occurred, his access to
Nostalgia's records must necessarily be broad and unrestricted."); cf. Security First
Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 570 (Del. 1997) (noting that
discovery in an inspection case involving management "should result in an order cir-
cumscribed with rifled precision").
96 No. 14556, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 1995).
97 Id. at *9.
98 See id. at *20 (noting the extreme nature of the scope of inspection proposals by
both sides).
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ously made available to a special litigation committee formed by the com-
pany in derivative litigation involving the same transactions. 99
A Delaware court also granted broad discovery in Holdgreiwe v. Nos-
talgia Network, Inc. ' In that case, a corporate director alleged that the
CEO and Chairman had misappropriated company funds. The court
found that the plaintiff had established a proper purpose to examine the
corporate books and records. 10 ' It proceeded to give the plaintiff "broad
and unrestricted" access to corporate information.
10 2
Investors also may want to communicate with fellow shareholders
about their investigation and potential litigation that may arise from it.
Certain types of shareholders, such as institutional investors, have their
own organizations and can easily communicate with fellow members.
10 3
Otherwise, shareholders must rely on public information, which will pro-
vide the names of only some shareholders.'0 State inspection statutes,
however, entitle shareholders to obtain a "stocklist" from the corpora-
tion, from which shareholders may learn the identities of all their fellow
shareholders.'015
A shareholder can demand a stocklist from the corporation. 0 6 If man-
agement refuses the demand, the shareholder can sue in state court to
force production.0 7 The shareholder must establish compliance with
99 See id. (finding the documents given to the special litigation committee "essen-
tial and sufficient" for inspection in the present case because they involved the same
transactions). That litigation was filed in California one week before the Delaware
plaintiffs initial demand and one week after the Delaware action began. See id. at *2-
3. Within two business days of the filing of the California case, the parties had agreed
in principle to a settlement. See id. at *3. Following the execution of that agreement,
the company appointed a special committee of its directors to investigate the allega-
tions of the California complaint, and it reviewed the company's books and records.
See id. at *3-4. The special committee ultimately recommended that the company
enter into the proposed settlement, subject to approval of its fairness by a California
court. See id.
'oo No. 12914, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 71, at *20 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1993) (granting
plaintiff "broad and unrestricted" access to defendant company's records).
101 See id. at *10 (finding a proper purpose in obtaining information to determine
whether management had mismanaged the company by misappropriating funds).
102 Id. at *20 (allowing access to various documents, including detailed financial
data, tax information, intra-corporate communications, and securities filings).
103 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 331-32 (discussing internal communications net-
works of institutional investors).
104 See id. at 331 (discussing limited ability of shareholder to determine identity of
other shareholders through public filings).
105 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991). For further explanation of
what information is included in a stocklist, see supra note 12.
106 See, e.g., § 220(b) (conferring right on a stockholder to inspect a corporation's
list of stockholders upon written demand).
107 See, e.g., § 220(c) (allowing stockholder to apply to the Court of Chancery for
an order to compel inspection).
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statutory formalities in making the demand."0 ' The burden then shifts to
the company to show that the shareholder's demand lacks a proper pur-
pose.109 If the company cannot make this showing, the court should or-
der it to produce the stocklist."10 The company cannot claim that commu-
nicating with other potential plaintiffs in a derivative suit is an improper
purpose for a stocklist request.11' Indeed, potential plaintiffs in a securi-
ties fraud action should be entitled to obtain a stocklist so as to communi-
cate with fellow shareholders about joining in a lawsuit.' 12
The Delaware statute requires that the plaintiff seeking books and
records must be a stockholder of record of the company. 13 Thus, share-
holders with potential securities fraud claims can not use the state inspec-
tion statute for discovery once they have sold all of their stock. Although
this asymmetry may be troubling in theory, in practice the problem is not
that severe. The potential plaintiff class frequently will include other in-
vestors who have retained an equity interest in the company and who can
use the inspection statute to obtain the information." 4
In short, investors who are concerned about potential corporate mis-
management or fraud and who have some evidence of wrongdoing can
use state inspection statutes to dig deeper into suspect transactions. They
can request books and records and a stocklist under these statutes. The
remaining question is whether it makes sense for investors to pursue this
approach.
108 See id. (requiring that shareholders comply with the statutory demand proce-
dure).
109 See id. ("Where the stockholder seeks to inspect the corporation's stock ledger
or list of stockholders . . . . the burden of proof shall be upon the corporation to
establish that the inspection he seeks is for an improper purpose."); Thomas & Betts
Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 685 A.2d 702, 708 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("Any doubts will be
resolved in favor of the statutory inspection right."), affd, 681 A.2d 1026 (Del. 1996).
110 See, e.g., § 220(c) (allowing the Court of Chancery to order immediate inspec-
tion or order production of a list of shareholders on a specific date, in return for the
reasonable cost of obtaining the list).
11 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1993) (noting that
a corporation has no legitimate interest in avoiding payment of compensatory dam-
ages to its owners).
112 The Compaq Computer court also offered an alternative rationale for its deci-
sion that the shareholder's purpose was not contrary to the company's interest: the
company would be protected because it could seek indemnification from its co-de-
fendant managers and advisors. See id. This rationale would apply with equal force
in most securities fraud actions as well.
113 See § 220(a) (defining "stockholder" as a "stockholder of record").
114 See Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing arrangement
where plaintiff in stocklist action acted as agent for potential acquiring company and
was reimbursed for all of its costs).
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III. THE COSTS OF USING THE DELAWARE INSPECTION STATUTE
In studying the utility of state inspection statutes as a discovery device
for securities fraud litigation, we have focused on the most widely used
inspection statute, section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law." 5 Before analyzing data on cases filed under this statute, we briefly
outline the statutory process that investors must follow." 6
The shareholder first must make a written demand on the corporation
to produce the information." 7 If the corporation fails to produce the re-
quested information within five business days of the shareholder's written
demand, Delaware law permits the shareholder to sue in the Chancery
Court to compel inspection in a summary judicial proceeding." 8 The
complaint must state that the shareholder has made proper demand on
the corporation and that either the required number of days has passed
without the production of the requested information or the company has
refused the shareholder's demand."' As noted, the complaint must also
state a proper purpose. 120 In order for the investigation of possible cor-
porate fraud or mismanagement to be a proper purpose, the shareholder
must allege facts sufficient to establish a "credible possibility" that such
fraud or corporate mismanagement has occurred.
121
The summary proceeding has a very narrow scope in a stocklist case.
The shareholder may obtain an ex parte order reducing the time that the
defendant has to answer the complaint and fixing an expedited trial
date. 122 Generally, thecompany must file its answer within ten days, and
a trial date will be set for a few weeks later.' 23 The timetable is more
115 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991).
116 This description is taken from a companion article by one of the authors on a
related issue. For a more complete discussion of the procedures used in litigating an
inspection case under the Delaware statute, see Thomas, supra note 1.
117 See § 220(b) (outlining procedures for requesting a corporation's business
records). More precisely, the shareholder making the request must be a stockholder
of record. See § 220(a). The shareholder may conduct the inspection personally or
appoint an agent to do it. See § 220(b). Furthermore, the demand must be made
under oath and delivered to the corporaiion's registered Delaware office or principal
place of business. See id. The shareholder should also offer to bear the reasonable
costs incurred by the company in connection with the production of the information.
See Thomas, supra note 1, at 347 n.96.
118 See § 220(c) (allowing for application to the Court of Chancery for an order to
compel inspection).
11 See id. (establishing a five-day limit for the company's reply and requiring that
the plaintiff establish compliance with the statutory demand procedure).
120 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
122 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 348 (describing the summary proceeding of a
stocklist case).
123 See id. (noting that this summary process can be shortened even further).
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extended in a books and records case.124
Discovery is limited in an inspection case. The defendant may depose
the plaintiff, but the deposition's scope is strictly limited to establishing
the validity of the plaintiff's stated demand purpose and compliance with
the statute's procedural requirements. 2 ' Also, the defendant may ask
the plaintiff to produce documents evidencing the plaintiff's stated pur-
pose and to produce any corporate documents that the plaintiff already
possesses.' 26 The Chancery Court will not expand the defendant's discov-
ery rights to cover other matters.
127
Close to the time of the hearing, the parties normally submit briefs on
the merits of the inspection demand. 128 As the trial date approaches, the
parties frequently choose to settle the case and file a stipulation of dismis-
sal. If the case proceeds to trial, and the court grants the plaintiff's re-
quest, it will normally order the immediate production of the docu-
ments. 21 With this background in mind, we turn to our analysis of the
data on inspection cases.
A. Description of the Data
We obtained our information on Delaware inspection statute lawsuits
from the public court files in the Court of Chancery for New Castle
County, Delaware. First, we asked the court clerk's office for a list of the
cases filed and resolved by settlement or court decision from 1981-1994
under title 8, section 220 of the Delaware Code. Using this list, we
searched each case file to obtain the date of the plaintiff's demand for a
stocklist or books and records; the date of the outcome of the litigation;
the disposition of the case by the parties or the court; the plaintiff's stated
purpose in making its demand; and the number of pages of litigation pa-
pers filed by each party. We had complete information on all of these
variables in ninety-one stocklist cases and fifty-three books and records
124 See id.
125 See id. (explaining the limited scope of a deposition).
126 See id. (explaining the limited nature of document production).
127 See id.
128 See id. (discussing procedure of the inspection action).
129 See id. However, the court frequently imposes certain conditions on the par-
ties. These include a requirement that the shareholder be given reasonable access to
the information, usually requiring that the inspection be conducted during regular
business hours at the corporation's offices. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)
(1991). Furthermore, in books and records cases, the court will limit its order to doc-
uments that are "essential and sufficient" to satisfy the shareholder's stated purpose.
See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 685 A.2d 702, 709 (Del. Ch. 1995),
affid, 681 A.2d 1026 (Del. 1996). This restriction protects the corporation's sensitive
business information from disclosure and stops potential abuses by shareholders. The
court may also require the shareholder to execute a confidentiality agreement before
permitting access to corporate documents. See id.
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cases; these cases constitute our final sample. Table 1 provides a break-
down of our stocklist sample by the year the complaint was filed and the
outcome of the case.' Table 4 contains similar information for the
books and records cases.
131
B. The Stocklist Cases
Table 1 reveals that shareholders did not obtain a stocklist in about
22% of the cases132-a surprisingly high number if one believes, as many
Delaware lawyers do, that "plaintiffs always get a stocklist."'
13 3 Most of
these failures, however, were in the context of voluntary settlements of
the litigation-what we categorize as a "Dismissal Without List.' 34 We
contacted the attorneys of record in these cases to determine whether a
stocklist ultimately was produced to the plaintiff by the defendants. We
treated those cases where we could not obtain this information as failures
to obtain the stocklist and compiled them in the "Dismissal Without Fur-
ther Information" category.
135
The Chancery Court denied the plaintiff shareholder's request for a
stocklist in only four of the 29 cases (14%) litigated to a decision. 1 6 This
130 See infra tbl. 1.
131 See infra tbl. 4.
132 See infra tbl. 1. This number is a calculation of "Plaintiff Does Not Obtain
List" cases as a percentage of the total cases in the sample.
133 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 31
(1992) ("The state courts always order the company to turn over the list.").
134 See infra tbl. 1. After filing a lawsuit, a plaintiff can obtain a stocklist either
through a court order or through an agreement of the parties to dismiss the lawsuit.
In all twenty-nine cases where a court order was entered, the order either denied the
shareholder's request (a failure) or ordered the defendant to produce the stocklist (a
success). See infra tbl. 1. In the remaining sixty-two cases, the parties reached a vol-
untary settlement as a result of which the plaintiff dismissed, or the parties agreed to
dismiss, the lawsuit and filed a stipulation of dismissal. See infra tbl. 1. This stipula-
tion commonly states the conditions of the dismissal, which may or may not include
the production of the stocklist. When the stipulation stated that the defendant would
provide the stocklist to the plaintiff, we counted that as a success. If the stipulation
did not provide for production of the stocklist, we counted that as a failure. We rea-
soned that if the dismissal required production of the information, the stipulation
would set out the terms for its production. This is particularly likely to be true for
books and records. Unfortunately, our definitions of success and failure may misclas-
sify cases where the plaintiff obtained the stocklist before filing the stipulation of dis-
missal and did not mention the receipt of the stocklist. As we note in the text, we
attempted to correct this problem by contacting the attorneys in these cases to find
out if the stocklist had been produced.
l35 See infra tbl. 1. To avoid overstating the cases where a stocklist was obtained,
we assume that the plaintiff did not obtain the requested information in these cases.
136 See infra tbl. 1. This number is a calculation of "Decision Against Plaintiff"
cases as a percentage of the total cases litigated to a decision.
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finding generally supports the claim of some scholars that state courts
invariably grant shareholder requests for stocklists. 13 7 Furthermore, in
situations where the plaintiffs did not succeed initially, they could refile
their case if its earlier defects were merely procedural.
To explore further the reasons some shareholders did not obtain a
stocklist, we examined the shareholders' "proper purpose" statements;
that is, why they sought to obtain a stocklist. 138 The proper purpose re-
quirement is intended to weed out unwarranted demands by stockhold-
ers. Most of the cases in our sample that the courts dismissed were dis-
missed because the plaintiff failed to state a "proper purpose" for the
stocklist demand.'
39
In Table 2, we present a frequency distribution by outcome of share-
holders' stated purposes for demanding a stocklist. 14 ° Purposes 2, 3, and
5 are concerned with shareholder communications. Collectively, they
constitute 61% of the stated purposes.' 41 Those shareholders who stated
one of these three purposes had a success rate of 83%,142 as compared to
a success rate of 70% for shareholders stating other purposes. 143 These
differences in the shareholders' rates of success in obtaining the compa-
ny's stocklist, however, are not statistically significant at the 10% level of
confidence. 1
44
We present in Table 3 descriptive statistics for the other variables in
137 See, e.g., Black, supra note 133, at 31 (stating that courts order provision of the
stocklist as a matter of course).
138 As noted above, the "proper purpose" requirement provides that a shareholder
is entitled to obtain a copy of the stocklist only for a lawful and reasonable purpose
germane to his status as a shareholder. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991);
see generally FOLK, supra note 13, at §§ 220.7-220.7.2 (discussing how courts have
approached document requests under the statute). Once the shareholder states a
proper purpose for obtaining a stocklist, the company has the burden of showing that
the stated purpose is improper. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12.
131 In three of the four court-ordered dismissals, the court found that the plaintiff
had failed to state a proper purpose. The fourth case was dismissed because of a
procedural defect.
140 See infra tbl. 2 (listing eight purposes used to obtain a stocklist and a break
down of the results of these attempts).
'"' See infra tbl. 2. This number is a calculation of the total number of times pur-
poses 2, 3, and 5 were used as a percentage of the total number of all purposes used.
142 See infra tbl. 2. This number is a calculation of the total number of times
"Plaintiff Obtains List" by using purposes 2, 3, and 5 as a percentage of the total
number of times purposes 2, 3, and 5 were used.
143 See infra tbl. 2. This number is a calculation of the total number of times
"Plaintiff Obtains List" by using purposes 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 as a percentage of the total
number of times purposes 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 were used.
144 In other words, although the shareholders' success rates in obtaining the stock-
list were higher when their purpose was to communicate with other shareholders, the
statistical differences in success rates were not sufficiently different that we can con-
clude they are not due to other factors.
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our stocklist sample.' 45 Panel A gives these statistics for plaintiffs who
obtained the stocklist, while Panel B lists similar information for unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs." 6 Panel C provides t-statistics for differences in the va-
riable means and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for differences in the variable me-
dians.
1 47
DELAY, the first variable shown in Table 3, measures the days elapsed
between the demand and the outcome dates. 148 In other words, DELAY
tells us how long a plaintiff can expect to wait for resolution of its case.
149
DELAY indirectly measures a defendant's ability to drag out the resolu-
tion of a stocklist demand and inflict indirect costs on the plaintiff. A
longer delay makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to communicate
quickly with other shareholders, and thus increases the plaintiff's total
costs.
Comparing Panels A and B of Table 3, we see that the median and
mean delays for successful shareholders seeking stocklists are slightly
more than one month and three months, respectively, while the median
and mean delays for unsuccessful shareholders are about two months and
over six months, respectively.150 The differences between the medians
and means are not significantly different.' 5'
Next, we include three variables that measure the pages of litigation
materials filed by the parties in inspection actions. 152 We attempt to esti-
mate the probable costs to parties of an inspection action from the
number of pages of litigation materials that prior litigants of such actions
have filed. Our hypothesis is that we can indirectly measure legal costs as
a function of the number of pages filed.' We discussed our approach
145 See infra tbl. 3. Our sample has several large outlier observations. Therefore,
we believe that the median values are more informative than the mean values. We
show both in the tables for completeness. See infra tbls. 3, 6.
146 See infra tbl. 3.
14 See infra tbl. 3.
148 See infra tbl. 3.
149 We define the demand date as the date of the plaintiff's written demand to the
corporation to provide information (in this instance, a stocklist). We obtained this
date from the plaintiffs demand letter to the corporation; the plaintiff must attach this
letter to the complaint filed at the Chancery Court. We define the outcome date as
follows: in cases in which the court decided in the plaintiff's favor, we used the date
for production of the information. In cases in which the court decided against the
plaintiff, we used the date of the court's final order resolving the demand. For settle-
ments in favor of the plaintiff, we used the date for production of the information
from the parties' stipulation of dismissal. Finally, for settlements in which the parties
did not provide for production of the information, we used the date the parties en-
tered the stipulation.
150 See infra tbl. 3, Panels A, B.
'5' See infra tbl. 3, Panel C.
152 See infra tbl. 3.
153 While there are many expenses involved in resolving legal disputes, we think it
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with practicing Delaware attorneys, who confirmed that our method
would provide a crude idea of legal costs. These attorneys also estimated
that the cost of bringing an uncomplicated stocklist case to trial would fall
between $10,000 and $25,000. However, they noted that this estimated
range could increase if the company chooses to strongly resist the plain-
tiff's request.
To examine litigation costs more closely, we looked at three subsets of
pages filed: PLTPAGES, the number of pages filed by the plaintiff;
DEFPAGES, the number of pages filed by the defendant; and
TOTPAGES, the total number of pages filed by both parties.' The
mean number for all three variables is slightly higher for shareholders
who did not obtain a stocklist than for those who did, while the median is
lower for all three variables.
155
Next, we examine the likely effect of cost on a potential plaintiff's suc-
cess in obtaining a stocklist by looking at the relationship of the plaintiffs'
filings and defendants' responses. Intuition suggests that these two vari-
ables will be highly correlated; that is, if a plaintiff files a large amount of
litigation papers, the defendant will respond in kind. In fact, the Pearson
correlation coefficient between PLTPAGES and DEFPAGES is .73 (p-
value < 0.001), which confirms that this intuition is accurate.
We also looked at the ratio of the total number of pages filed by the
plaintiff to the total number of pages filed by both parties in order to
measure the probable relative burdens on the parties of litigating inspec-
tion cases (PLTTOTAL)."5 ' Our hypothesis was that a plaintiff would file
a higher proportion of pages in cases where the plaintiff obtains a stock-
list. Both univariate tests, however, fail to show a statistically significant
difference.
157
C. The Books and Records Cases
Tables 4 through 6 compile the data on our books and records sample
in the same manner as for the stocklist cases.' 5 ' Table 4 shows that share-
is reasonable to conclude that total litigation costs increase with increases in court
filings. An alternative measure of filings would be the number of documents filed by
the parties. As one commentator pointed out to us, the computerization of legal prac-
tice may mean that lawyers can complete and file form documents with large numbers
of pages just as easily as short ones. We decided to stay with the number of pages
filed because the Delaware lawyers we interviewed told us that either measure would
be equally likely to capture the cost effect we are seeking to measure.
154 As with the DELAY variable, we believe that the median levels of the variables
are likely to be more informative because of the presence of large outliers.
155 See infra tbl. 3.
156 See infra tbl. 3, Panels A, B.
157 See infra tbl. 3, Panel C.
158 See supra Part III.B.
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holders did not obtain books and records in 32% of the cases.159 As with
the stocklist data, most of these cases resulted from voluntary settlements
and dismissals of the litigation. 6 ° As with the stocklist cases, we were
unable to obtain conclusive information from the attorneys of record
about the result in some of these cases. 161 These are listed in the "Dis-
missal Without Further Information" column and are treated in the same
manner as the stocklist data.
The litigated books and records cases where a court issued an opinion
are less numerous in our sample than the stocklist cases. The Chancery
Court denied the plaintiffs' requests in 3 of the 16 cases litigated to a
decision. 62 The reason for these denials was failure to allege a proper
purpose. This indicates that the Delaware courts are turning down some
shareholder requests for books and records.
To explore this result further, we examined the shareholders' stated
reasons for seeking to obtain books and records. In Table 5, we show the
distribution of shareholders' stated purposes for demanding books and
records, sorted by case outcome. 63 Because we are particularly con-
cerned with shareholder claims of securities fraud, we focused on cases
involving allegations of corporate mismanagement or breach of fiduciary
duties by officers and directors, purposes 4 and 6, respectively.' Share-
holders seeking to uncover potential corporate wrongdoing would be
most likely to state one of these purposes. We find that shareholders stat-
ed one of these purposes in twenty-six of the fifty-three books and
records cases in our sample. 65 The success rate in cases where the share-
159 See infra tbl. 4. This number is a calculation of the total number of times
"Plaintiff Does Not Obtain B & R" as a percentage of the total number of cases.
160 As in the stocklist cases, a plaintiff can obtain the requested books and records
either through a court order or through an agreement of the parties dismissing the
lawsuit. In all sixteen cases where a court order was entered, the order either denied
the shareholder's request (a failure) or ordered the defendant to produce the books
and records (a success). See infra tbl. 4. In the remaining thirty-seven cases, the
plaintiff dismissed, or the parties agreed to dismiss, the lawsuit and filed a stipulation
of dismissal. See infra tbl. 4. This stipulation commonly states the conditions of the
dismissal, which may or may not include the production of books and records. When
the stipulation stated that the defendant would provide to the plaintiff the books and
records, we counted that as a success. If the stipulation did not provide for produc-
tion of the books and records, we counted that as a failure. As noted in the text, we
contacted the attorneys in these cases to determine if our classification of dismissals
without books and records as failures was correct.
161 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
162 See infra tbl. 4.
163 See infra tbl. 5.
164 See infra tbl. 5.
165 See infra tbl. 5. The numbers presented in Table 5 do not directly correspond
to these figures because shareholders sometimes stated multiple purposes. We have
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holders stated one of these two purposes is approximately 64%.166 This is
nearly identical to the 63% rate for shareholders alleging other pur-
poses. 167 We note that the frequency distribution of stated purposes for
books and records cases shown in Table 5 is much more dispersed than in
the stocklist cases.
All of the other books and records variables are defined in the same
manner as the stocklist data.16 We present descriptive statistics for these
variables in Table 6.169 Panel A presents summary statistics for those
cases where the plaintiff obtained books and records, while Panel B pro-
vides the same statistics for those cases where the plaintiff did not get the
books and records. 7° Panel C shows t-statistics for differences in the va-
riable means and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for differences in the variable me-
dians.
171
The DELAY variable shows that the median and mean delays for suc-
cessful shareholders are about three months and over seven months, re-
spectively, while the median and mean delays for unsuccessful sharehold-
ers are about nine months and over eleven months, respectively. 172 The
differences between these medians are significant at the 5% confidence
level and the differences between the means are significant at the 10%
confidence level.
173
Once again, we use the number of pages of litigation filings as a proxy
for the cost of a books and records lawsuit, with the intuition that the
more pages a party files, the greater its legal expenses will be. As before,
we confirmed this by interviewing Delaware attorneys. These attorneys
also estimated the cost of a books and records case at $25,000 to $50,000.
Once again, they noted that this fee range would rise if the company
strongly resisted the shareholders' demand.
Using the same variables as used in the stocklist cases-PLTPAGES,
DEFPAGES, and TOTPAGES-we find in books and records cases that
unsuccessful shareholders have insignificantly lower mean and median
numbers of pages filed for PLTPAGES and TOTPAGES, although the
separately calculated the statistics in the text accompanying this note and notes 166
and 167 infra.
166 See infra tbl. 5. This number is a calculation of the total number of times
"Plaintiff Obtains B & R" by using purposes 4 and 6 as a percentage of the total
number of times purposes 4 and 6 were used.
167 See infra tbl. 5. This number is a calculation of the total number of times
"Plaintiff Obtains B & R" by using purposes 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 as a percentage of the
total number of times purposes 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 were used.
168 See supra Part III.B.
169 See infra tbl. 6.
170 See infra tbl. 6, Panels A, B.
171 See infra tbl. 6.
172 See infra tbl. 6, Panels A, B.
173 See infra tbl. 6, Panel C.
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reverse is true for DEFPAGES. 74 We also find that the Pearson correla-
tion coefficient between PLTPAGES and DEFPAGES is .69 (p-value <
0.001), evidencing a high correlation between filings of plaintiffs and de-
fendants in these cases.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A. Caveats
Before considering the policy implications of our results for legal re-
form, we should highlight several qualifications that counsel caution in
interpreting these results. First, based on our sample of litigated cases,
we were unable to measure the number of successful shareholders who
received documents under the Delaware inspection statute without re-
course to litigation. As a result, our statistics may overstate the costs to
shareholders of using the inspection procedure to obtain information.'75
Second, we cannot determine every reason why cases may have settled
without the shareholder obtaining the stocklist or books and records. In
some of these cases, it is possible that the shareholder filed suit to pres-
sure the company to provide other relief, obtained the information with-
out mentioning it in the stipulation filed with the court, or decided for
reasons unrelated to the litigation that it no longer needed the stocklist or
books and records. Classifying these cases as failures may overstate the
number of unsuccessful cases. We have partially corrected for this prob-
lem by gathering additional information from lawyers that litigated these
cases. 176 However, as noted above, there are still numerous cases with
uncertain results.
Third, we cannot measure plaintiff's success in obtaining all of the
books and records needed to properly investigate suspected mismanage-
ment or fraud. The courts restrict successful plaintiffs to those documents
that are "essential and sufficient" to achieve the plaintiffs stated pur-
pose. 177 These documents may not be enough for the plaintiffs to deter-
mine if their suspicions of fraud are well founded.
174 See infra tbl. 6, Panels A, B. In other words, we are unable to substantiate our
hypotheses (discussed in note 153 and the accompanying text) that there are statisti-
cally significant differences between the number of pages filed by successful and un-
successful plaintiffs and between successful and unsuccessful defendants.
175 We searched Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings for all public
corporations to locate available data on companies reporting stocklist demands, but
the data we generated were clearly incomplete. Federal law does not require report-
ing companies to disclose this information. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (stating
that an issuer of securities must make a report to the SEC containing information as
prescribed by the SEC); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 to 240.13f-2 (1996) (listing the infor-
mation an issuer of securities must disclose in its reports).
176 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
177 See FOLK, supra note 13, at § 220.5 n.68 (compiling cases involving limitations
on the records that will be provided under the Delaware inspection statute).
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With all of these qualifications in mind, we turn to our analysis of the
data.
B. Is The Delaware Inspection Statute An Effective Discovery Device
For Potential Securities Fraud Plaintiffs?
What does our empirical research tell us about the usefulness of the
Delaware inspection statute as a pre-litigation discovery device for plain-
tiffs contemplating securities fraud actions? Our results suggest several
reasons why plaintiffs' lawyers have not rushed to use the Delaware in-
spection statute as a pre-suit discovery device.
First, filing a books and records action led to obtaining at least some of
the desired information in only about two-thirds of the cases in our sam-
ple. 1 78 Even where the plaintiffs' purpose was to investigate corporate
mismanagement or fraud, as it would be if plaintiffs chose to follow the
Rales court's suggestion, 79 shareholders whose stated purpose was to in-
vestigate corporate wrongdoing did no better than those with other pur-
poses; both groups failed to obtain books and records in about one-third
of the cases. 8° Shareholders using the Delaware inspection statute to
obtain a stocklist were successful in about 78% of the cases examined,181
but this information is only useful if a plaintiff decides that it has a suffi-
cient basis to file a securities fraud complaint.
182
Second, plaintiffs likely will face substantial delays in pursuing an in-
spection suit. The median successful stocklist plaintiff in our sample
spent over a month in litigation, while unsuccessful plaintiffs waited even
longer.183 The successful books and records plaintiff's median wait ex-
ceeded three months, while the median unsuccessful shareholder spent
over eight months in litigation.
184
Third, plaintiffs likely will face substantial costs, at least $10,000 to
$25,000, in litigating a stocklist case, and $25,000 to $50,000 in pursuing a
books and records case, before even determining if they should file a se-
curities fraud action.' 5 However, these costs will be at least partially off-
178 See infra tbl. 4. The books and records were obtained in 68% of the cases. This
number is a calculation of the total number of times "Plaintiff Obtains B & R" as a
percentage of the total number of cases in the sample.
179 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
181 See infra tbl. 1. This number is a calculation of the total number of times
"Plaintiff Obtains List" as a percentage of the total numbers of cases in the sample.
182 As noted above, a stocklist will be useful to a potential securities plaintiff large-
ly as a means of contacting other prospective plaintiffs to join the action. See supra
text accompanying notes 12, 103-12.
'83 See infra tbl. 3.
184 See infra tbl. 6.
185 However, if the shareholder decides to file a securities fraud action based on
evidence it uncovered in the inspection case, it will not need to engage in as much (or
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set by reductions in the discovery costs in the subsequent securities fraud
action. In fact, there may be some net cost reductions if it is faster and
less costly to obtain information about potential securities fraud through
an inspection proceeding-which is an expedited and summary proceed-
ing-than through the normal discovery process in a securities fraud ac-
tion. 186 Discovery under the inspection statute also could be more fo-
cused than in a securities fraud case.1
8 7
any) discovery in the fraud case. This will reduce costs in the second action. In fact, if
the expedited summary inspection proceeding is a cheaper method of obtaining dis-
covery than regular civil litigation, it may be more efficient for the plaintiff to use it.
The relative efficiency of seeking books and records under the inspection statute
versus using the regular discovery process in class action litigation under FRCP 26 can
only be ascertained by further empirical research. The mandatory discovery proce-
dures under FRCP 26(a) do provide plaintiffs with some information relatively quick-
ly. Our discussions with practicing attorneys in Delaware about the comparative ad-
vantages of the two systems lead us to believe for several reasons that the inspection
statute procedure is preferable for plaintiffs in most cases.
First, and most obviously, the Reform Act renders the usual discovery procedure
unavailable to plaintiffs in securities fraud cases. See supra Part I.B. Even if Con-
gress altered the Reform Act to make such discovery possible, the Delaware lawyers
we spoke with expressed a strong preference for the inspection procedure. They be-
lieve that the information they receive through this procedure is more complete be-
cause it is not redacted and is produced subject to closer judicial scrutiny, thereby
reducing the number of discovery disputes. For further discussion of this point, see
Cathy L. Reese & Randall S. Thomas, The Shareholder As Inspector: Using State
Statutory Rights to Monitor Management (1997) (working paper on file with au-
thors).
186 Cf supra notes 183-84. To make this comparison, one would need to collect
information on the time and cost of discovery in securities fraud actions. The authors
have not collected this'data and are unaware of any existing data on the issue.
187 If this is the case-and we have no data to prove that it is-the narrow focus of
discovery will have positive and negative aspects for the plaintiff. The benefit to
plaintiffs is that they may need to expend fewer resources to get documentary infor-
mation about the alleged fraud sufficient to determine whether they should file suit.
Even circumstantial evidence of fraud that would satisfy the intent requirement would
be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The negative aspect of this highly focused
discovery is that the plaintiff only has access to written materials, not oral testimony.
While the documentary record may be enough to determine whether fraud has oc-
curred-or at least to find enough evidence of fraud to satisfy the Reform Act's
pleading requirements-it is possible that such evidence only would be available
through oral testimony. While we cannot quantify the number of cases where this
may be the case, it should be borne in mind that the plaintiff only needs to find
enough evidence to satisfy the fraud pleading requirements. If the written record
does not yield even this amount of evidence of fraud, this would suggest either that no
fraud has occurred or that the defendant has hidden or destroyed its records of the
fraud. The latter scenario is troubling in all litigation, and if evidence of such conceal-
ment or destruction is found, this could be grounds for asking a court to take ex-
traordinary action, such as ordering oral testimony. See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, DuPont
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Fourth, plaintiffs with strong reasons to suspect corporate wrongdoing
and enough evidence to plead fraud with particularity need not wait the
additional time to litigate a books and records case. A shareholder
should consider using section 220 only in borderline cases, where the
shareholder is uncertain whether it will be able to meet the fraud plead-
ing requirements of the Reform Act. Although plaintiffs who suspect
corporate wrongdoing will not want to wait the additional time to find
out if they will obtain books and records before filing their securities
fraud action, the trial court could permit the plaintiffs to pursue their
inspection case and refrain from deciding any motions to dismiss in the
securities fraud action until the inspection case has been resolved. How-
ever, even plaintiffs whose inspection action is successful will have to
spend tens of thousands of dollars and go through a summary trial, just to
obtain the documents needed to learn if they have a viable fraud claim.
On the other side of the coin, the potential benefits of examining cor-
porate documents could be particularly significant for plaintiffs consider-
ing suing nonregistered companies. In these instances, there may be few
public sources of information.1
88
In the case of a registered company," 9 a plaintiff can gain access to
Again Faces Allegations of Withholding Benlate Test Data, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1995,
at B6 (reporting that a federal judge ordered DuPont to show why it should not be
guilty of fraud for allegedly withholding discoverable evidence).
188 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 360 n.157 (describing information available from
registered companies).
189 Our analysis and data focus on the Delaware statute because of Delaware's
importance as the state of incorporation of such a large number of publicly held com-
panies. Delaware is also the home of a very large number of private corporations.
The statistics that we present may be less useful for litigants seeking information
about corporations that are not incorporated in Delaware. Plaintiffs would prefer to
seek inspection in states where the corporation laws provide a summary method of
judicial review of inspection demands. The Model Business Corporation Act (MB-
CA) gives shareholders such a right. See 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 16.04(a)
(1985 & Supp. 1996). All but seven states follow the MBCA's pattern of "expressly
providing for a statutory inspection proceeding under which a court of competent
jurisdiction may compel the production of corporate records for examination by a
qualified shareholder." Id. at 16-65 to 16-66 (as of December 1, 1995). Some of these
state statutes track the language of the MBCA provision, providing this proceeding as
a summary one. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1604 (West 1996); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-116-104 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 607.1604 (West 1993). Other
state statutes have similar expedited inspection mechanisms, albeit in slightly different
form. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1603 (West 1990) (providing for judicial enforcement
of inspection demands with "just and proper conditions"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 624 (McKinney 1986) (providing for summary process in inspection statute). Some
judges may be unfamiliar with inspection cases because such cases are litigated infre-
quently outside Delaware. This may result in longer delays, greater variation in out-
comes, and possibly greater costs. We would strongly argue for changes to the ex-
isting statutes and procedures in states where plaintiffs face.these obstacles.
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internal company documents if it wins a books and records case. These
documents could give the plaintiff grounds to plead with particularity a
securities fraud action. Moreover, if the plaintiff examines these docu-
ments and finds no evidence of fraud, it can save itself the expense of
continued litigation by dismissing (or not filing) the securities case.
Shareholders who engage in this form of discovery would have a strong
argument that they should have a lead role in the securities litigation.
Their actions would illustrate their determination and adequacy as a class
representative. Although a larger shareholder could claim that it should
occupy this lead position by virtue of the Reform Act's presumption that
the largest shareholder is the most adequate lead plaintiff, that presump-
tion is rebuttable.19 Shareholders that have already successfully litigated
a books and records case and discovered evidence of fraud should have a
convincing argument that they are entitled to be lead plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that many shareholders will be reluctant to rely on the
Delaware inspection statute as a method of pre-securities fraud litigation
discovery. Inspection actions are lengthy and costly, and they have un-
certain outcomes. If Delaware wants to provide shareholders with a bet-
ter avenue of pre-suit discovery through its inspection statute, it should
consider streamlining the existing process. It could do this by amending
its inspection statute to provide for quicker trials, attorney fee awards
against defendants that unjustifiably resist shareholder's legitimate in-
spection demands, and other mechanisms to give potential securities
plaintiffs more liberal access to corporate documents.1 91
190 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
191 For further discussion of possible reforms to the Delaware inspection statute,
see Thomas, supra note 1, at 364-69.
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE OF FILINGS IN DELWARE CHANCERY COURT TO
OBTAIN STOCKHOLDER LIST
Plaintiff Obtains List Plaintiff Does Not Obtain List
Dismissal
Number Decision Decision Dismissal Without
Year of of Filings in Favor of Dismissal Against Without Further
Filing Per Year Plaintiff With List Plaintiff List Information
1981 1 0 1 0 0 0
1982 6 1 1 0 0 4
1983 4 4 0 0 0 0
1984 15 5 7 1 0 2
1985 8 1 4 1 0 2
1986 7 4 3 0 0 0
1987 5 0 5 0 0 0
1988 5 0 3 1 0 1
1989 5 0 3 1 0 1
1990 7 1 6 0 0 0
1991 5 0 3 0 0 0
1992 12 6 5 0 1 0
1993 10 3 4 0 3 0
1994 1 0 1 0 0 0
Total 91 25 46 4 4 12
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TABLE 2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STATED PURPOSES FOR USE
OF STOCKHOLDER LIST
Plaintiff Obtains List































6. To fulfill fiduciary
duty as a member




























a Total exceeds total number of filings from table 1
given.







(91) due to multiple purposes
1997]
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TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH
REQUEST FOR STOCKHOLDER LIST BY OUTCOME
(Dismissals Without Further Information
are considered unsuccessful)
Standard
Variablea Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A: Plaintiff Obtains Stockholder List (N=71)
DELAY 111.9 168.4 9 43 980
PLTPAGES 81.1 111.9 4 39 700
DEFPAGES 56.7 91.2 0 18 500
TOTPAGES 137.8 187.9 8 66 1.200
PLTPAGES 68.4% 22.6% 6.0% 71.4% 100.0%
Panel B: Plaintiff Does Not Obtain Stockholde List (N=20)
DELAY 187.2 256.5 9 70 876
PLTPAGES 128.1 344.5 4 19 1,500
DEFPAGES 79.7 177.6 0 5 600
TOTPAGES 207.8 493.9 7 26 2,150
PLTPAGES 70.3% 31.4% 6.3% 74.8% 100.0%
Panel C: t-statistics for Test of Differences in Means and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for








*** The variables in panels A and B are statistically different at the .01
level.
* The variables in panels A and B are statistically different at the .10
level.
Variable definitions are as follows:
DELAY Number of days between demand and outcome dates.
PLTPAGES Number of pages filed by plaintiff.
DEFPAGES Number of pages filed by defendant.
TOTPAGES Total number of pages filed by plaintiff and
defendant.
PLTTOTAL Percentages of total litigation pages filed by plaintiff.
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TABLE 4
SAMPLE OF FILINGS IN DELWARE CHANCERY COURT TO
OBTAIN BOOKS AND RECORDS (B&R)
Plaintiff Obtains B&R Plaintiff Does Not Obtain B&R
Dismissal
Year Number Decision Decision Dismissal Without
of of Filings in Favor of Dismissal Against Without Further
Filing Per Year Plaintiff With B&R Plaintiff B&R Information
1981 1 1 0 0 0 0
1982 1 0 0 0 0 1
1983 1 1 0 0 0 0
1984 3 2 1 0 0 0
1985 2 0 1 0 0 1
1986 3 2 1 0 0 0
1987 4 0 3 0 0 1
1988 5 0 3 1 0 1
1989 7 2 1 0 0 4
1990 6 0 4 1 0 1
1991 5 0 3 0 0 2
1992 6 2 2 1 0 1
1993 8 3 3 0 2 0
1994 1 0 1 0 0 0
Total 53 1
Total 53 13
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TABLE 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STATED PURPOSES FOR USE
OF BOOKS AND RECORDS (B&R)
Plaintiff Obtains B&R Plaintiff Does Not Obtain B&R































6. To fulfill fiduciary
duty as a member

















































1 3 0 2 1
16 37 5 6 16
a Total exceeds total number of filings from table 6 (53) due to multiple purposes
given.
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TABLE 6
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH
REQUEST FOR BOOKS AND RECORDS BY
OUTCOME
(Dismissals Without Further Information are considered unsuccessful)
Standard
Variablea Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A: Plaintiff Obtains Books and Records (N=36)
DELAY 210.7 242.4 8 109 980
PLTPAGES 93.3 219.3 6 35 1,342
DEFPAGES 55.6 85.4 0 13 341
TOTPAGES 148.9 277.9 8 61 1,648
PLTPAGES 70.0% 25.3% 20.0% 74.5% 100.0%
Panel B: Plaintiff Does Not Obtain Books and Records (N=1 7)
DELAY 347.8 275.6 27 259 876
PLTPAGES 86.8 171.1 4 25 700
DEFPAGES 59.5 119.7 0 19 500
TOTPAGES 146.4 288.7 6 46 1,200
PLTPAGES 67.5% 27.4% 6.3% 72.7% 100.0%
Panel C: t-statistics for Test of Differences in Means and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for








** The variables in panels A and B are statistically different at the .05
level.
* The variables in panels A and B are statistically different at the .10
level.
Variable definitions are as follows:
DELAY Number of days between demand and outcome dates.
PLTPAGES Number of pages filed by plaintiff.
DEFPAGES Number of pages filed by defendant.
TOTPAGES Total number of pages filed by plaintiff and
defendant.
PLTTOTAL Percentages of total litigation pages fied by plaintiff.
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